The decisions made at the 1992 Helsinki Summit stated "We have provided for CSCE (Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the former name of OSCE) peacekeeping according to agreed modalities. CSCE peacekeeping activities may be undertaken in cases of conflict within or among participating States to help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort at a political solution. In this respect, we are also prepared to seek, on a case-by-case basis, the support of international institutions and organizations, such as the EC, NATO and WEU, as well as other institutions and mechanisms, including the peacekeeping mechanism of the CIS." This provision formed the basis of NATO's humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999. But using foreign forces to intervene in internal conflicts is not acceptable in northeast Asia. So we cannot fully copy the goals and methods of OSCE in this region. However, the OSCE approach to confidence and security-building (a unique role that lies between diplomatic mediation and military intervention); talks and negotiations; peacekeeping, crisis management and promoting economic and technology exchange and cooperation, can be models for northeast Asia.

We could establish some institutions that conform to regional characteristics. For example, Summit Conferences, a Ministerial Council, a Senior Council/Economic Forum, a Permanent Council, a Forum for Security Cooperation, and a Secretariat. At present, we do not need a Parliamentary Assembly, an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, or a High Commissioner on National Minorities. Conflict mediation and control teams can be formed as conditions require.

On drafting political security documents, we can also learn from the OSCE, though it would not be possible to sign a document like the Charter for European Security which includes a consensus on values and security inspections. But it would be possible to agree other principled political documents along the same lines as the European Conventional Armed Forces Treaty, Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation with regard to Emergency Situations and the Vienna Declaration which focus on participants' basic stances and views on security, economic cooperation and environmental protection.

Furthermore, we should study the structures and modes of operation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (which consists of Canada, China, United States, Japan, South Korea and Russia) as well as the experience and principles of the Six-Party Talks, i.e. equal negotiation, mutual understanding and accommodation, patience and flexibility, mutual benefit, consensus and gradual progress. In particular, we need to prevent a single country from becoming the core of the mechanism and avoid dealing with issues from a single point of view or a single set of assumptions.

The northeast Asian security mechanism cannot simply copy the experience of the Six-Party Talks, either. The Six-Party Talks were not formed on the basis of multi-lateral negotiations and agreed documents, but were temporarily formed under the pressure of a nuclear crisis. The northeast Asia mechanism must be an organization based on certain agreements and principles. It will regulate the level of participants, conference timings and corresponding administrative and coordinating institutions. Its goal is not to solve a single issue but to reach agreement on a broad spectrum of security issues and co-operative activities. Unlike the Six-Party Talks, the northeast Asia security mechanism will probably include military delegates from member states to discuss the confidence-building among armed forces. The conference could be fixed in one country or rotated among different countries. But the main role of the host country is to provide logistical support, not to play a leading role as China did in the Six-Party Talks.

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