How real is N. Korea's nuclear threat?
- By Zhao Jinglun
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E-mail China.org.cn, April 18, 2013
![Going fist to fist [By Jiao Haiyang/China.org.cn]](http://images.china.cn/attachement/jpg/site1007/20130418/001ec949c22b12d9ddca10.jpg "Going fist to fist [By Jiao Haiyang/China.org.cn]") |
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Going fist to fist [By Jiao Haiyang/China.org.cn] |
Pyongyang has disclosed (intentionally) U.S. targets for its nuclear ballistic missiles, including Washington, Colorado Springs and Hawaii. Is this for real, or just "drawing cakes to allay hunger," as the Chinese proverb goes?
True, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that North Korea is capable of making a nuclear weapon small enough to be delivered by a ballistic missile. But that report had some caveats: its assessment was made with only "moderate confidence" and that the North Korean weapon's "reliability will be low" -- inaccurate missiles and doubtful survivability of a warhead through flight and detonation on a specific target.
The DIA is just one of America's sixteen intelligence organizations. On the same day as its assessment was disclosed, James R. Clapper Jr., U.S. director of national intelligence, released a statement saying that the DIA assessment did not represent a consensus of the nation's intelligence community and that "North Korea has not yet demonstrated the full range of capabilities necessary for a nuclear armed missile."
As the New York Times pointed out, the DIA argued most vociferously -- and incorrectly -- that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program.
Miniaturization of a nuclear weapon is no cake walk. Back in March 1999, that is, some fourteen years ago, a U.S. congressional committee headed by Rep. Chris Cox, R-Calif. accused China of "stealing" U.S. nuclear secret, claiming that China's miniaturized warhead looked remarkably like America's W-88. It provided no evidence whatsoever. I wrote a piece that appeared in the March 23, 1999 issue of The Miami Herald, refuting that accusation as totally groundless.
Thus far, Pyongyang has conducted three underground nuclear tests with increasing yields, but none greater that those dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As for missiles, North Korea deployed on its east coast a few Musudan medium-range missiles that have never been tested. It also has another untested missile, known as the KN-08 with a longer range provided by a Russian arms manufacturer. In all, these represent a none-too-impressive arsenal.
But Clapper admitted that getting inside the young Korean leader Kim Jong-un's head -- and understanding his goals -- has been particularly frustrating. He suggested that Kim apparently intended to demonstrate both to North Koreans and to the international community that North Korea deserves respect as a nuclear power. Domestically his objective is to consolidate his power. Internationally, as a nuclear power entitles him to negotiation and to accommodation, and presumably aid. In other words, he is using his nuclear arms as a bargaining chip.
North Korea has declared its strategy of parallel development of the economy and nuclear arms and proposes to establish an atomic energy ministry. The farther it goes along the road to nuclear capability, the less likely it will accept denuclearization.
China, the United States, Russia, Japan and South Korea all want Pyongyang to denuclearize. The confrontation has gone far enough. When and under what conditions will the six parties come to the negotiation table? That remains to be seen.
The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit: http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/zhaojinglun.htm
Opinion articles reflect the views of their authors, not necessarily those of China.org.cn.
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