Africa's BRICS opportunity

The enlargement of BRICS offers African countries a broader range of economic opportunities by bringing them into closer relationships with some of the world's largest markets, important sources of development finance, and countries with substantial capabilities in manufacturing, energy, infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, agriculture and advanced technologies. At a time when international economic relations are becoming increasingly fragmented, this wider range of relationships gives African countries greater room for manoeuvre.

But a wider choice of trading partners, sources of finance and technological partners will mean much less if Africa continues to export raw materials, import sophisticated technologies and occupy the lower reaches of global value chains, because the destinations of African commodities may become more diversified without fundamentally altering Africa's position in the international division of labour. The problem, therefore, is not simply the direction of extraction, but the structure of the relationships through which extraction occurs.

This should therefore be central to the African debate about BRICS as BRICS enters its third decade: how can African countries use this changing configuration of economic relationships to build productive power on the continent? The success of Africa's engagement with BRICS cannot be measured simply by increases in trade, investment or infrastructure finance, but should increasingly be assessed by whether these relationships enable African economies to translate their mineral and energy resources, labour, knowledge and expanding continental market into greater productive, technological and institutional capabilities.

Building productive capability

Africa's experience gives this question particular historical significance. The continent has been deeply integrated into the world economy for centuries, but largely through a structure in which minerals and agricultural commodities travelled enormous distances while much of the processing, manufacturing, technological capability and financial value associated with them was captured elsewhere.

The post-colonial challenge has therefore been not simply to trade more, but to build the productive capabilities that allow African economies to retain more value from what they produce. Yet building these capabilities has become more difficult as several economies have experienced premature deindustrialisation before manufacturing reached the scale needed to absorb large numbers of workers and sustain productivity growth. Domestic firms often remain small, supplier networks remain shallow, linkages between universities, technical institutions and industry remain weak, and infrastructure still too often reflects the historical logic of moving commodities from sites of extraction to ports rather than connecting African centres of production.

The African Continental Free Trade Area creates an opportunity to address these constraints at a continental scale. A continental market can support forms of industrial specialisation that smaller national markets cannot, but the agreement will realise its developmental potential only when African firms possess the productive capacity to supply that market. Lowering tariffs creates trade opportunities; it does not by itself produce the firms, electricity, logistics, finance, skills and technical standards required to exploit them.

The expansion of BRICS creates new possibilities within this African project, but it does not guarantee the outcome. This is particularly evident in the minerals required for the global energy transition. African countries possess significant deposits of manganese, platinum-group metals, cobalt, lithium and other minerals needed for batteries, electric mobility, renewable-energy systems and the wider low-carbon economy. In South Africa, this means asking whether mineral endowments, an established industrial base, scientific institutions and engineering capabilities can support battery production, fuel cells, electric mobility and renewable-energy equipment. Elsewhere, mineral extraction can be connected to refining, processing, component manufacturing, engineering services and technical skills.

Regional integration must consequently become as much an industrial project as a trade project. A viable African battery value chain need not be contained within one country: minerals extracted in one economy can be processed in another, components can be manufactured where capabilities already exist, and assembly can take place near sufficiently large markets. The strategic objective should be to connect these capabilities across the continent so that regional integration expands participation in higher-value activities.

Utilising new partnerships

BRICS cooperation can be brought directly into this developmental space. Its members collectively possess capabilities that African economies require: industrial finance, advanced manufacturing, energy technologies, digital systems, agricultural technologies, pharmaceuticals, logistics expertise and large consumer markets. The strategic African objective should therefore be to use these relationships to close specific productive gaps rather than to approach BRICS principally as another destination for commodities. The test of each partnership is whether it leaves firms stronger, engineers more capable, supplier networks deeper and regulatory institutions better equipped than before.

This requires developmental statecraft, understood not simply as a rhetorical commitment to the state's role in development, but as the organised capacity of public institutions to identify productive opportunities, direct finance towards them, negotiate technology partnerships that leave capabilities behind, coordinate the policy instruments required for productive transformation and sustain these efforts through the inevitable difficulties of implementation.

The infrastructure and technology challenges illustrate the practical implications. Much of Africa's transport network still reflects an extractive economic geography. The next generation of infrastructure must connect African economies and link transport corridors to processing facilities, industrial parks, energy systems, universities, cities and regional markets rather than simply moving commodities more efficiently to ports. When an African country acquires sophisticated technology, the relevant question is what remains after the transaction: whether engineers understand it, whether universities can teach and improve it, whether domestic firms can enter its supply chains and whether the technology can progressively be adapted to local circumstances.

Finance is equally pressing. Large infrastructure projects can attract BRICS capital, but smaller domestic manufacturers and regional suppliers frequently lack the patient finance required to expand production, meet technical standards and enter value chains. BRICS financing mechanisms including the New Development Bank could therefore make a particularly consequential contribution by complementing large infrastructure investment with financing for productive enterprises, supplier networks and industrial projects.

These possibilities will not materialise automatically. Africa possesses many of the minerals upon which emerging industries will depend, the youngest population of any continent, enormous renewable-energy potential and a continental market whose importance will grow considerably during this century. Yet history provides ample evidence that endowments do not by themselves produce development. The primary responsibility therefore falls on African states rather than external partners. BRICS cannot perform these functions on Africa's behalf nor should it. What it can do is enlarge the range of instruments available to countries pursuing productive transformation.

Africa therefore confronts BRICS with both an opportunity and a test. The opportunity is a wider range of markets, finance, technologies, industrial partners and development experiences. The test is whether the continent uses this greater room for manoeuvre to transform its productive structure or merely diversify the destinations of its commodity exports. BRICS can enlarge Africa's field of possibilities, but it cannot determine what Africa builds within it. The changing international order can give Africa greater room to act while productive power will determine what it can do with that room.