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China and the end of meta-narratives

By Eric X. Li: 0 Comment(s)Print E-mail China.org.cn, July 19, 2013

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Adaptability

Most political scientists would tell you that a system monopolized by a single party is by definition incapable of self-correction. It can't survive long because it can't adapt.

Here are the facts: During its 64 years running the largest country in the world, the range of the Party's policies was broader than any country in recent history. Radical land collectivization and the Great Leap Foreward, then the quasi-privatization of farmland. The Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping's market reforms. Deng's successor, Jiang Zemin, took the giant political step of opening up Party membership to private businesspeople – something unimaginable during Mao's rule. The Party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions.

Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain positions for life. They accumulated power and perpetuated their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule also led to disastrous mistakes. So the Party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 – 70.

One thing we often hear is that political reform has lagged behind economic reform and China is in dire need of political reforms. But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. Some have decided a priori what changes they want to see and only such changes can be called political reform. But political reforms have never stopped. Compared with ten years ago, twenty years ago, and thirty years ago, just about every aspect of Chinese society and how the country is governed, from the most local to the highest center, are unrecognizable. Such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind.

I would venture to suggest that the Party is the world's leading expert in political reform.

Meritocracy

The second assumption: one-party rule leads to a closed political system in which power gets concentrated in the hands of the few. Bad governance and corruption are the results.

Yes, corruption is a big problem. But let's first look at the larger context. It might be counter intuitive to you, but the Party is one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world.

China's highest ruling body is the Politburo. It usually has 25 members. In the most recent Politburo only five came from privileged backgrounds (the so-called princelings). The other 20, including the president and the premier, came from completely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger Central Committee of over 300, the percentage born into wealth and power was even smaller. The vast majority of senior officials worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that to the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you would find the Party ranks near the top in upward mobility.

The question then is how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful institution little known to Westerners – the Party's Organization Department. The Department functions like a human resource engine that would be the envy of even the most successful corporations.

It operates a rotating pyramid.

It is made up of three components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations such a university or a community program. They form separate and yet integrated career tracks for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in one of these tracks. They start at the lowest level, called ke yuan. Periodically, the Organization Department reviews their performance and can promote them up through four increasingly elite ranks: fu ke, ke, fu chu, and chu. These are not moves from Karate Kids. It's serious business.

The range of positions is wide, from running health-care in a village to foreign investment in a city to manager in a company. Once a year, the Organization Department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, peers, and subordinates, vet their personal conducts, conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote winners.

Throughout their careers, these cadres could rotate through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the good ones move beyond the four base-level grades to the fu ju and ju levels. There they enter high officialdom. At that point a typical assignment is to manage districts with populations in the millions or companies with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues. To show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fu ke and ke levels, 600,000 fu chu and chu levels, and only 40,000 fu ju and ju levels.