During the Chinese New Year, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) went ahead with what North Korean state media claims was the country's third nuclear test. The test, which took place on February 12 at the Punggye-ri test site, occurred despite urgings from China and the wider international community for North Korea not to proceed down such a route. It also runs in contravention to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874 and 2087, which demand that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear tests. Ultimately, the test has gone some way towards undermining Chinese national interests and further increased the amount of pressure that the international community places upon China to bring North Korea back in line.

Prior to the test, on February 4, an editorial within the Global Times stated, "China should gradually make clearer its policies on the Peninsula situation, clearly showing the outside world its bottom line. For the Korean Peninsula issue, if China plays an active role, it won't be caught unprepared if the situation deteriorates." Two days later in the same newspaper, an editorial forcefully stated that DPRK would pay a "heavy price" if it insisted on pursuing a third test. DPRK went ahead with its test as planned regardless of calls to do so otherwise.

Leaders in Beijing quickly backed the UN condemnation of the test and North Korea's ambassador was summoned for a meeting with foreign minister Yang Jiechi, who according to a statement from the Chinese foreign ministry, "demanded the DPRK side cease talk that further escalates the situation and swiftly return to the correct channel of dialogue and negotiation." A Xinhua article, following the DPRK test, noted that, "in the long run, dialogue and negotiations, instead of confrontation and barbs trading, are the optimal means to eventually solve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula." Yet, in the UN Security Council press statement issued on February 12, it was noted that "members of the Security Council will begin work immediately on appropriate measures in a Security Council Resolution", in line with previous Resolution 2087 which expressed a determination for "significant action" in the event of a further nuclear test.

For its part, the Global Times has refrained from tough talk, stating that China should adhere to its current policy regarding North Korea, adding that the test does not necessarily mean that China's North Korea policy has failed but that, "China does need to give a stern warning or even punishment to North Korea if it hurts China's interests. But the warning should be one that informs a strategic friend about China's bottom line."

Ultimately, China's bottom line has not yet been revealed and it is quite clear that North Korea has not yet reached it. Whether such information detailing China's bottom line was conveyed to the North Korean ambassador, Ji Jae Ryong, remains to be seen. Meanwhile, China is cautious of adopting a resolution referencing Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which provides for economic, military and other sanctions; having rejected a draft press statement when the Security Council met on February 12, over the possible reference of a resolution based on Chapter 7.

Criticism has already been directed towards China from the DPRK following the adoption of Resolution 2087 on January 22, which sought to strengthen sanctions following the DPRK's use of ballistic missile technology during a launch on December 12, 2012. Such criticism, along with the North Korean conviction that nuclear capability is non-negotiable, has highlighted the apparent lack of leverage that Beijing has over the situation and the possible alienation that leaders in DPRK may be experiencing. And with regards to the leverage that Beijing does possess, in reference to food and economic assistance, it appears that these details have little sway over the course of proceedings. Chinese leaders are almost certainly wary of further alienating an already unpredictable DPRK government, alongside considerations of promoting conflict on the border and energizing illegal black market trade past its current point.

China itself is feeling hemmed in by the United States' pivot towards Asia and will be keen on maintaining its regional system of cooperative and non-confrontational relations with surrounding neighbors intact. North Korean actions threaten this Bismarck-like regional arrangement, pushing countries ever closer to the US. China's preference is for a resumption of Six-Party Talks, which stalled following a DPRK satellite launch in 2009 which ultimately led to a renewed open desire to pursue a survival strategy based on nuclear capability. Chinese hopes that the Six-Party Talks provide a suitable forum for solving this issue may be misplaced if only for the reason that North Korea refuses to budge on the issue of maintaining a nuclear deterrent.

Unfortunately, UN sanctions are unlikely to alter Pyongyang's course and if a recent report from Reuters, which cited an unidentified source claiming that DPRK is planning further nuclear tests this year in order to force the US into diplomatic talks, turns out to be true, China could find itself forced into an even more impossible position. The Korean Peninsula crisis is fast becoming a Chinese one. Leaders in Beijing will be hoping that, via backdoor diplomatic channels, they can deflate the current level of tension by steering the DPRK away from an even more militarist course by reassuring it of its regional security. At the same time, Chinese leaders will be hoping to convince western observers that North Korean actions are less about signaling and more about what the Chinese government believes to be a perceived sense of insecurity whilst also making a stance alongside the international community at the UN. In light of the fact that North Korea is the only country that China is treaty-bound to defend via military means, Beijing will be hoping to achieve this almost impossible task before the DPRK takes matters too far and reaches China's as yet unknown bottom line.

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