This columnist had the opportunity this past weekend to talk with Dr. Robert G. Patman, head of the Department of Politics and professor of international relations at the University of Otago, New Zealand, regarding the recent attack by Al-Shabab in Garissa, Kenya. Dr. Patman, the author of "Strategic Shortfall: The Somali Syndrome and the March to 9/11," stressed that a Somalian problem can only have a Somalian solution. Here's the full conversation:

What is the significance of the Garissa attack in Kenya? Does it showcase a resurgent al-Shabab?

Following the 2013 terrorist attack on the Westgate Mall and several other terrorist incidents in Kenya, the Garissa attack highlights several points. First, Kenya's participation in the African Union's intervention in Somalia continues to have blowback for the Kenyan government. Second, the Islamist al-Shabab is far from defeated. The militants may have been beaten out of their strongholds in Somalia by Kenyan and other AU peacekeeping forces over the last two years and lost some of their leaders through a combination of American airstrikes and defections, but ironically these reverses in Somalia made the terrorist group more diffuse and more likely to resort to periodic soft-target attacks like Garissa in neighboring Kenya. When it controlled large parts of Somalia, its hands were full: collecting taxes, policing the streets and administering its cruel forms of Shariah law justice. It was stretched thin and distracted. Now relieved of the burden of administering territory, al-Shabab can focus on jihad.

Is the African Union force effective at all in tackling the problem in Somalia?

The African Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, is an active, 21,500-strong regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the UN in Somalia. After AMISOM troops from a coalition of countries dislodged al-Shabab from areas it controlled in Somalia, ill-disciplined militia forces filled the vacuum. In other words, AMISOM prevailed in military terms against al-Shabab, but did not have an effective plan to win the peace in Somalia. The Obama administration backed AMISOM troops, but it was a relatively low-investment, light-footprint approach to counterterrorism. The White House's approach reflects Obama's firm belief that outside military forces can't compel change in troubled parts of the world. This week's vicious killings in Garissa were depicted by White House officials as desperate actions by an al-Shabab organization in decline, but some analysts disagree with this assessment. They argue the recent atrocity in Kenya demonstrates how difficult it is to destroy militant groups in places such as Somalia, where decades of war and famine have created vast, chaotic and largely ungovernable areas.

How might this attack affect the domestic sectarian division in Kenya between Christians and Muslims, which is, as we already know, troubled along religious lines?

It is widely believed that the attack on Kenya's Garissa University College on Thursday is part of a strategy by the militant group al-Shabab to divide Christians and Muslims and deepen sectarian divisions. The attackers spared Muslim students during the violent attack at Garissa but brutally murdered their Christian counterparts. Al-Shabab probably wanted to show that they are still very much a force by trying to inflame religious and sectarian violence in order to deepen divisions in Kenya and appeal to more alienated Muslim youths in the country. At the same time, al-Shabab is deliberately trying to fuel an atmosphere of fear and insecurity in Kenya, a country that has been making impressive economic progress in recent years.

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